China’s courts are the harshest in the world. Every year around 2000 people are executed. Judges can impose the death penalty not just for murder, but for almost any offense, including theft, forgery, smuggling antiques, imparting criminal methods, organizing prostitution, even VAT fraud.
But what are the social and political roots of this savage sentencing policy?
Most commentators assume it is a hangover of hard-line Maoism¹. But this is more or less the opposite of the truth.
A recent study by Chinese legal experts² demonstrates that use of the death penalty became widespread and routine during the period of free market reforms begun by Deng Xiaoping and continued by his successor, Jiang Zemin.
Deng summed up his policy as reform and opening up on the one hand, and law and order on the other. He dismantled socialism and replaced it with a form of managed capitalism. As Maoist egalitarianism gave way to a highly stratified social order, judicial terror replaced the ideological glue and workplace discipline that had bound Chinese society
The 1979 penal code, summing up the position at the end of the Maoist era, reserved capital punishment for serious violent crime and treason.
But from 1982 to 1995 a series of decisions of the National People’s Congress extended the death penalty to an ever greater number of non-violent crimes.
At the same time, the Supreme People’s Court devolved its role in reviewing death sentences to local courts, effectively giving them free reign. Executions were particularly frequent during periodic ‘strike hard’ law and order campaigns. According to legal expert Zhao Bingzhi, during the 1980s and 1990s the courts developed a ‘blind faith in the death penalty’.
Present leader Hu Jintao, thought of as a relative hard-liner by Western commentators, has recently ordered a rethink. As a first step, the right of appeal to the Supreme Court has been restored in death penalty cases.
The closest historical parallel to China’s system is 18th Century England’s Bloody Code. From 1650 to 1815 the number of capital offenses rose from 50 to 288, allowing commercial landowners to enrich themselves through the enclosure of common land and consolidate their grip on power after the chaos of the Civil War.
In China, a new possessing class, enriched by privatization of state assets, but widely resented and yet to feel secure, is in the process of securing its power following the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.
England’s Bloody Code was undermined by juries who refused to convict criminals of capital offenses. In China’s case we can only hope that the desire for international respectability will lead the government to curb its bloody assizes.
1 See for example The Debate Over the Death Penalty in Today’s China, Zhang Ning, China Perspectives no 62
2 The Road of the Abolition of the Death Penalty in China Ed. Zhao Bingzhi, Press of People’s Public Security University.